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NOTES AND COMMENTS
PERFORMANCE ENHANCING DRUG USE IN OLYMPIC SPORT: A
COMPARISON OF THE UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIAN
APPROACHES
I. INTRODUCTION
Performance Enhancing Drugs (PEDs) have been used
throughout the history of the Olympics. During Greek times,
popularity of the ancient Games gave rise to astronomical
increases in the rewards to successful athletes.' Some athletes
earned incomes of as much as half-a-million dollars by today's
standards. 2 In the wake of this commercialism, athletes were
"reputedly willing to ingest any substance that might enhance their
performance." 3 Ultimately, this evolution eroded respect for the
rules and eventually contributed to the dissipation of the ancient
Games.
4
The downfall of the ancient Games foreshadowed the
downfall of Greek and then Roman societies.5 Similarly, the
Modern Games may mirror greater societal problems, albeit from
the extreme perspective. Olympic athletes are not representative
of the ordinary citizen. They are, however, very visible to the
ordinary citizen. Olympic athletes are the role models and heroes
for future generations. Like other public figures, they mirror the
changes in our culture. While seemingly unimportant when
compared with the world's problems, increasing PED use by
athletes indicates changes in society at large. This highly visible
1. AUSTRALIAN SPORTS DRUG AGENCY, DRUGS IN SPORT, at http://
www.ausport.gov.au/asda/dishistory.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2002) (on file with Loyola
of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review) [hereinafter ASDA].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. JAMES A. R. NAFZIGER, INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW 16 (Transnational
Publishers 1988); ASDA, supra note 1.
5. See NAFZIGER, supra note 4, at 16-17; ASDA, supra note 1.
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medium, the Olympic Games, disseminates hope and goodwill, or
alternatively, highlights scandal and unfairness. The PED problem
afflicts all society as much as it afflicts the Games. As Olympic
history continues, PEDs use will also continue. But how the
Olympic sporting organizations and their nations deal with the
PED problem is visible to the world and can instill hope for a
better tomorrow.
Since its inception, the modern Games have been afflicted
with drug use. 6 Yet, only recently have the organizers recognized
PEDs as a systemic problem rather than as a few isolated
occurrences. 7 Today, the International Olympic Committee (IOC)
and its participating nations generally agree that PEDs are
inconsistent with the Olympic spirit and are dangerous to athletes. 8
Consequently, most PEDs are banned or restricted. 9
The PED restrictions, however, often are not enforced
because participating nations lack the technology and resources
necessary to adequately test athletes. 10 Thus, some athletes escape
rigorous testing and compete while using PEDs.11 For example,
twenty-seven athletes and thirteen coaches from one country
withdrew 12 from the 2000 Games after a revolutionary drug testing
method was approved for use at the Games. 13 Without this testing,
each of these athletes would have been able to compete while
taking PEDs.14 Even with the new testing, athletes who have a
history of positive drug tests are not barred from competition.1 5
By contrast, other athletes are punished for inadvertent use or
have historic performances diminished by public suspicion of use.
6. ASDA, supra note 1.
7. The first recorded doping incident of the modern Games occurred when a cyclist
died as the result of PEDs in 1884. Yet, the IOC did not begin testing for drugs until 1967
when another cyclist died during a televised race. ASDA, supra note 1.
8. See OLYMPIC CHARTER ch. 5, R. 48; INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITrEE,
OLYMPIC MOVEMENT ANTI-DOPING CODE 3 (Jan. 1, 2000).
9. See OLYMPIC MOVEMENT ANTI-DOPING CODE, supra note 8, at 3; OLYMPIC
CHARTER ch. 5, R. 48; NAFZIGER, supra note 4, at 148.
10. See Glenn Zorpette, The Chemical Games, SCI. AM., Fall 2000, at 16-17.
11. See id.
12. Randy Harvey, Not Every Fairy Tale Has Happy Ending, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 12,
2000, at D1.
13. Jacquelin Magnay, No, Minister, the Sydney Olympics Won't Be Drug-free,
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Aug. 15,2000, at 12.
14. See Zorpette, supra note 10, at 16.
15. For example, shot putter, C. J. Hunter, tested positive four times prior to the 2000
Games, but was never expelled from competition. Alan Abrahamson, Hunter Is Pleading
Innocent, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2000, at U1.
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For instance, a sixteen year-old Romanian gymnast was stripped of
her gold medal at the 2000 Games when she tested positive for
PEDs after ingesting an over-the-counter cold medicine.16 The
medicine was given to her by a team doctor who was either
unaware the medication contained a banned substance or did not
warn her that it would cause a positive drug test.17 Similarly, a
swimmer, who won multiple medals at those Games became the
media poster child for drug use although she never tested positive
for PEDs.18 Fellow athletes and the media commented that her
record setting performances must have occurred due to drug use,
and thus devalued her amazing accomplishment based on
suspicions and not proof.19
Enforcement problems and public suspicion aside, athletes
who use PEDs risk their health and compromise their integrity in
order to gain personal and financial success.20 On the other hand,
athletes who abide by the rules and abstain from PEDs jeopardize
their chance to win because they cannot compete at the same level
as athletes that use PEDs.21 In the end no one wins because an
assumption of guilt attaches every time an athlete has an
extraordinary performance or unexpectedly withdraws from
competition.22 Furthermore, when an athlete tests positive for
drugs the reputation of the entire sport and the competition is
compromised.
As the organizer of the Games, the IOC is influential in the
development of international sports law, especially in relation to
16. Lisa Dillman, Romanian Gymnast Caught in the Middle, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 29,
2000, at U6. Romanian Gymnast, Andrea Raducan, was stripped of her gold medal at the
200 Games after testing positive for pseudoephedrine, which is an ingredient in common
over the counter cold medications. A team doctor prescribed the medication to both
Raducan and teammate, Simona Amanar. Presumably, the doctor made an error.
Ironically, Amanar did not test positive for the substance and moved into the gold medal
spot once Raducan was banned. The doctor confirmed that both athletes were given the
same medication, but Amanar did not test positive because she weighed more. Id.
17. Id.
18. See Lisa Dillman, Scrutiny of De Bruijn Familiar Story to the Irish, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 19, 2000, at U9. Dutch swimmer, Inge de Bruijn, set the world record the 100-meter
butterfly at the 2000 Games. Even though she never tested positive for drug, there was
widespread speculation by the media and other swimmers that her performances were the
result of drug use. Id.
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., David Lesser, Playing Games with Cheats, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD, July 7, 2000, at 36.
21. See, e.g., id.
22. See, e.g., Dillman, supra note 18.
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PED use.23 Unfortunately, while the IOC sets official policy for
the Games, it is not capable of investing the money required to
police athletes, coaches and sports administrations in all of its
participating countries. Even if the organization was able to
allocate sufficient resources, there is no guarantee that the
participating nations would adopt the IOC drug policy. In practice,
the IOC only coordinates and outlines Olympic policy. The
implementation and ultimate success of the policy depends on the
support of participating nations. Only individual nations and their
sports governing bodies can regulate the day-to-day lives of the
athletes and coaches. Thus, the IOC cannot have an effective drug
policy until the participating countries, as a group, agree to enforce
a uniform drug policy.
24
For this reason, an examination of two recent host countries,
the United States and Australia, is useful to illuminate the
challenges of effective PED policy implementation. This comment
explores how Australia and the United States have implemented
the IOC policy and concludes that the Australian policy has been
more effective in curbing PED use.
Part II examines the dangers of PEDs. Part III explores the
role of the IOC in relation to PED use. Part IV evaluates the
differing legal approaches of the United States and Australia to
PEDs. Part V discusses the role of the Australian and United
States Olympic Committees. Finally, Part VI reviews the
adjudication of PED disputes in both countries.
II. WHY PEDs ARE A PROBLEM
A. Dangers of PED Use to Athletes' and Public Health
The IOC, civil governments and the medical community
consider PEDs to be dangerous to the health of athletes, the
integrity of the Games and the spectators who idolize the
athletes. 25 PED abuse can lead to long-term adverse health effects,
23. See NAFZIGER, supra note 4, at 2-4.
24. See discussion infra Part III.
25. See J. Cummiskey, Medical Care of Athletes in the Era of Performance
Enhancing Drugs of Sport (PEDOS) Syndrome, 92 IRISH MED. J. 325, 326 (1999);
National Strategy to Help Fight Drug Use and Doping in Sport: Hearing on H.R. 4500
Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci. and Transp., 106th Cong. 1-3 (1999)
(statement of Barry McCaffrey, Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy)
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making the short-term performance benefits less appealing. 26 Side
effects run the gamut from minor inconvenience to death.27 In
addition, medical authorities have indicated that PEDs can be
psychologically addictive.
28
Although PED use most directly effects the athletes who take
them, use also threatens public health.29 The increased use of
PEDs by elite athletes has been strongly linked to a subsequent
rise in PED use by recreational exercisers and children.30 This was
exemplified by increased PED use following the summer Olympics
in both Atlanta (hosted in 1996) and Sydney (hosted in 2000).31
The increases in PED use have also been linked to increases in the
illicit drug trade.
32
B. Extent of PED Use
By some estimates, drug use to enhance performance is so
pervasive that athletes not taking drugs are the minority. A 1990
study by an Australian commission asserted "that up to 60 per cent
[sic] of Australia's elite athletes were using banned substances."
33
Similarly, a U.S. track coach testified at a Senate hearing that
more than 40% of her Olympic athletes were using steroids during
their preparation for the 1988 Games.34 While the exact number of
athletes using PEDs is unknown, "scattered evidence suggests
troubling pervasiveness, at least in some sports and among certain
teams." 35 Further complicating the issue, individual countries and
[hereinafter ONDCP Drugs in Sport]. For a discussion about particular drugs enhancing
abilities and their detriments see Zorpette, supra note 10, at 19.
26. See Cummiskey, supra note 25, at 325; Zorpette, supra note 10, at 19.
27. See Cummiskey, supra note 25, at 325; Zorpette, supra note 10, at 19.
28. Cummiskey, supra note 25, at 326; CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA RECHERCHE
SCIENTIFIOUE, SYNTHETIC REPORT: DOPING AND SPORTS COLLECTIVE EXPERT
ASSESSMENT (1998), available at http://www.cnrs.org [hereinafter SYNTHETIC REPORT].
29. ONDCP Drugs in Sport, supra note 25, at 5, 6; SYNTHETIC REPORT, supra note
28.
30. ONDCP Drugs in Sport, supra note 25, at 5; SYNTHETIC REPORT, supra note 28.
31. Lesser, supra note 20; See also Mark Forbes, The Scandal of Australian Sport:
The Drug Games, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Apr. 25,2000 at 19.
32. See AUSTRALIAN CUSTOMS SERVICE, AT THE BORDER at
http://www.customes.gov.au/olympics/brieffacts.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2000); ONDCP
Drugs in Sport, supra note 25, at 6; Lesser, supra note 20; Forbes, supra note 31.
33. Lesser, supra note 20.
34. Zorpette, supra note 10, at 18 (quoting Pat Connolly, former U.S. Olympic
women's track coach). Among popular PEDs are erythropoietin (EPO), human growth
hormone (HGH), stimulants, anabolic steroids and masking agents. See id. at 19.
35. Id. at 17.
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sports organizations can choose to regulate different drugs.36
Indeed, PEDs are commonly found in legal over-the-counter and
prescription drugs or food products.37 Consequently, it is easy to
ingest banned substances inadvertently.
C. Motivations for PED Use
"[Illegal] drug use by a small minority... undermine[s] the
fundamental... [principles] of athletic competition, in which
victory goes to the contestant who best combines such attributes as
strength, coordination, endurance, discipline and cunning. ' 38
PEDs enhance these abilities.39 One source estimated that PED
use can increase performance by up to fifteen percent.4° Where
the difference between making the Olympic team and winning a
gold medal is measured in tenths of a second, this margin of
improvement is significant.
Given the assumption that PEDs are effective, athletes are
motivated to use them for a variety of reasons. Use can stem
directly from a desire for increased performance, dissatisfaction
with current performance or both.41 PED use can also be more
psychological than physical; the athletes can develop a
"psychological dependence" by using PEDs to "cope with anxiety
or stress" or to bolster confidence. 42 Moreover, PED use may even
be unrelated to performance goals. For example, athletes who are
searching for approval from family, friends or coaches,43 and
athletes who are motivated by prestige, fame or financial reward
36. Many professional athletes use PEDs legally in their countries but this use would
violate Olympic rules thereby creating a different standard for Olympic and professional
competition. See Tom Regan, Rising Clash over Drugs in Sports, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Aug. 12, 1999, at 1.
37. See Zorpette, supra note 10, at 19. Dietary supplements have the added problem
that the label does not always reflect all the ingredients in the product. Evidence suggests
that athlete who take supplements may be ingesting banned substances unknowingly
because the substance was not reflected on the label. The IOC and WADA take a strict
liability approach; whether the athlete meant to take the drug is irrelevant to the infliction
of punishment for the drugs presence in the athlete's body. See Peter Waldman, The
Olympic Doc Takes on a Hometown Power, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 2002 at A8.
38. Zorpette, supra note 10, at 17.
39. See id. at 19.
40. Ashley Dunn, Olympics Again Put Oft-Abused Amgen Drug Under Scrutiny,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2000, at C1 (quoting Charles Yesalis of Penn State University and
expert on the IOC's doping efforts).
41. ASDA, supra note 1; Lesser, supra note 20.
42. ASDA, supra note 1.
43. Id.
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may use PEDs to achieve social status.44 Finally, some PED use
occurs simply because the athlete does not believe PED use is
wrong.
45
PEDs may also be popular because athletes do not think they
will get caught.46 Since the IOC began "formal drug testing" at the
Olympics in 1968, 47 they have been struggling to keep up with new
methods of performance enhancement. 48 One commentator
theorized that:
[I]t is a virtual certainty that a large number of cheating athletes
will beat the tests. Many of them will use a drug that cannot
now be detected in urine. Others will carefully schedule and
limit their use of banned substances so that their biochemical
indicators will be below the threshold that the International
Olympic Committee (IOG) interprets as a damning
result .... [S]ome athletes will even take drugs, be caught and
then have their sanctions overturned by an arbitration process
that tends to exonerate all but the most poorly informed and
reckless cheaters.
49
As quickly as the technology for testing advances, so too does the
masking techniques. Thus, PED use persists despite IOC efforts to
prevent it.
III. IOC CANNOT SOLVE THE PROBLEM ALONE
The IOC is not the appropriate organization to assume the
responsibility of PED eradication from the international sports
world. First, the IOC has a small budget and a narrow mission to
promote the celebration of the Olympic Games. Second, to fulfill
its mission and ensure participation by diverse nations, the IOC
must compromise among many different societal and cultural
ideologies. Eradicating PED use often conflicts with these
ideologies, and therefore causes the IOC to choose between





47. Zorpette, supra note 10, at 17.
48. See id.
49. Id. at 16-17.
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
A. IOC has Limited Resources and a Narrow Mission.
According to official policy, the IOC only maintains seven
percent of the revenue from any Olympic Games.50 At the 2000
Olympics the IOC maintained $91 million of the $1.3 billion
generated. 51 Whether this is adequate income or not is arguable,
however, the reality is that IOC only performs ten percent of the
tests that would occur in one large country (e.g. the United
States). 52 Thus, the IOC, whether it has the money, has not
allocated enough money to combat the PED problem.
The allocation may be due to the IOC's narrow mission. Its
primary aim is to "ensure the regular celebration of the Olympic
Games." 53 Beyond this, the IOC acts as an umbrella organization
providing promotion and consultation for sports and sporting
organizations around the world.54  In fact, most of the
responsibilities to oversee the athletes are left to the International
Sports Federations (IFs) and the National Olympic Committees
(NOCs). 55 Since they plan and implement all non-Olympic
competitions and control the National Governing Bodies of Sports
(NGBs), the IFs and NOCs are in a better position to influence the
day-to-day PED testing of athletes.56
B. Establishing and Enforcing Drug Policies Runs
Contrary to the IOC Mission.
To ensure the Games continue, the IOC must capitulate to
national governments so that the majority of the world's athletes
will continue to participate in the Games. 57 Its role is often to
reach a consensus on policy, facilitating compromise between
50. Michael McGuire, All Rewards and No Risk Makes Loads for Non-Profit,
AUSTRALIAN, July 7,2000, at 38.
51. Id.
52. Cummiskey, supra note 25, at 325; see also McGuire, supra note 50.
53. OLYMPIC CHARTER ch. 1, R. 2.
54. See id.
55. For an interesting opinion on why the IOC lacks power over the ultimate
implementation of the Games see John Powers, Salt Lake 2002 on the Olympics; IOC
Becomes Lord of Five-Ring Circus, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 24, 2002, at F2. The author
asserts that as a result of the 2002 Salt Lake Games scandals, the IOC has been forced to
distance itself from the oversight of many Olympic events including drug testing and
organization of the Games. Id.
56. James B. Jacobs & Bruce Samuels, The Drug Testing Project in International
Sports: Dilemmas in an expanding Regulatory Regime, 18 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 557,560 (1995) (citing LORD KILLANIN, MY OLYMPIC YEARS 155 (1983)).
57. See CHRISTOPHER R. HILL, OLYMPIC POLITICS 34-59 (2nd ed. 1996).
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conflicting agendas. 58 Thus when political actions cause athletes to
withdraw, the IOC does everything it can to bring those athletes
back to the Games.59 It needs to have flexible policies to quickly
react to athletes and countries that threaten to leave because of a
conflict with IOC policy. Since the IOC is primarily involved in
international political actions, it cannot have PED control as a
primary objective. A successful drug policy requires clear,
enumerated and enforceable rules, which would hinder the IOC's
ability to react to fluid international situations.
Additionally, it is not in the IOC's interests to require
governments or the IFs to abide by its rules. The IFs have other
sporting events that may have different PED regulations than the
Olympics. 60 For example, the world soccer governing body (FIFA)
believes the Olympic PED policy conflicts with its own interests in
World Cup soccer.61 Thus, it has limited its participation in the
Olympics to developing athletes.62 Even further, players skip the
Games to participate in other income creating events either
because they feel they need to use PEDs which are legal at the
other events or because the Olympics conflicts directly with these
events.63 The IOC's desire to have "the best of the best" 64 and the
large numbers of viewers that tune in for soccer prompted the IOC
to consider changing its PED policy to keep FIFA involved in the
Olympics. 65 This issue remains unresolved because FIFA, like
other sports organizations, does not agree with the IOC's PED
policy and FIFA is not dependent upon the IOC for its funding or
existence. 66 In the words of one journalist, "the Games need
soccer more than soccer needs [the Games]."
'67
58. For example, the Games were threatened when Taiwan and China split, when the
United States and then the Soviet Union withdrew from successive Games and when the
Games were canceled due to World War I and II. See id.
59. See id.
60. NAFZIGER, supra note 4, at 151-152.
61. International Federations of Sport do not completely endorse the IOC policy. In
the case of Soccer, only development athletes compete in the Olympics. Michael Cockerill,
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As a result, the IOC must often compromise with the IFs and
national governments 68 to achieve its mission-to "lead the
promotion of Olympianism." 69 The IOC's mission to promote the
Olympics forces an irreconcilable conflict of interest with its anti-
doping policy. To resolve this conflict, another organization must
enforce the PED policy.
C. Creation of the World Anti-Doping Agency
Recently, the IOC created the World Anti-Doping Agency
(WADA) "to coordinate a comprehensive anti-doping
programme... laying down common, effective, minimum
standards.., and seeking equity for all athletes in all sports.. .and
in all countries." 70 Like the IOC, WADA's mission is to
coordinate other international anti-doping organizations. 71 Its
effectiveness depends on its ability to persuade the IFs and
participating nations to implement uniform PED policy.72
The appropriate role for both WADA and the IOC is to set
policy and give guidance about the rules of sport. While the
existence of WADA may lessen criticism about conflicts of interest
in PED testing, WADA is still not the appropriate organization to
implement PED policy. Rather, the nations themselves must
provide implementation and funding to enforce the uniform PED
policy set by WADA. So, what is the ideal organization and
support for each nation to have? Examining the PED programs of
Australia and the United States may be helpful in evaluating this
question because they are well-developed models.
68. See NAFZIGER, supra note 4, at 139-155. One of the biggest compromises was to
eliminate the rule against professional athletes. Id. The compromise included more
athletes and ensured a high level of competition. Id. PED use in professional sport is
common. See Regan, supra note 36.
69. OLYMPIC CHARTER ch. 1, R. 2.
70. WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, DRAFT MISSION STATEMENT art. 4.1 (Oct. 1,
1999), available at http://www.wada-ama.org [hereinafter WADA MISSION STATEMENT].
71. See id. art. 4.1.
72. See id. art. 4.4.
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IV. NATIONAL LEGAL SOLUTIONS TO PED USE
A. U.S. PED Policy: All Talk and No Laws
The United States has an ambitious policy that actively seeks
to reduce illegal drug use.73 The federal government funds an
entire office devoted to the elimination of drugs-the Office of
National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). The ONDCP has a
"holistic view" 74  that includes domestic and international
solutions, namely, the education of America's youth about illegal
drugs, the reduction of their use and the elimination of the supply
of illegal drugs.75 The policy espouses zero tolerance for drugs of
any kind.
Similarly, the federal government is sensitive to the specific
dangers of PED use to athletes. In 2000, President Clinton noted
that steroid use among young people had risen by fifty percent.76
President Clinton also recognized that "[tihe use of drugs in sport
has reached a level that endangers not just the legitimacy of
athletic competition but also the lives and health of athletes. '77 In
response, the Senate conducted hearings concerning doping in
sports.
78
Unfortunately, although the United States has an ambitious
national drug control plan on paper (or in theory), 79 no PED
specific laws have passed. 80 Effectively, PEDs are only a trivial
concern for the federal government in comparison to its other
73. See ONDCP Drugs in Sport, supra note 25; Office of National Drug Control
Policy, Position Paper: Recommendations of the White House Office of National Drug
Control Policy to the International Olympic Committee Concerning Fighting Drug Use in
Sports (Nov. 17, 1998) [hereinafter ONDCP Position Paper]; The Office of National Drug
Control Policy's Fiscal Year 2001 Budget Hearing on H.R. 7090 Before the Subcomm. on
Treasury, Postal Serv., and Gen. Gov't, House Comm. on Appropriations, 106th Cong.
(2000) (statement of Barry McCaffrey, Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy)
[hereinafter ONDCP Fiscal Policy].
74. ONDCP Fiscal Policy, supra note 73.
75. Id.
76. Associated Press, White House Panel to Study Doping in Sports, SALT LAKE
TRIB., Aug. 10, 2000, at C2.
77. Id.
78. See ONDCP Drugs in Sport, supra note 25.
79. See ONDCP Fiscal Policy, supra note 73.
80. See 21 U.S.C.S. § 812 (Lexis 1998). Performance Enhancing Drugs are not listed
in the statute. Id.
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illicit drug problems.81 The White House through the ONDCP
affords strong rhetoric against PEDs, but little specific legislative
backing.
82
B. Australian Legislation Provides Guidance to PED Problems
Australia's approach is less severe when compared to the U.S.
zero tolerance policy. Australian law is founded on the belief that
drug crimes are not as serious as other crimes. 83 Consequently,
Australian law often treats drug offenders as victims and
prescribes both rehabilitation and punishment. 84 Laws pertaining
to drug use are listed under health legislation rather than criminal
legislation.85 Unlike the U.S. where PED and illicit drug use are
addressed under the same zero tolerance legal scheme, Australian
laws treats PED and illicit drug use separately. This separation
allows PEDs to gain legal importance without being overshadowed
by or confused with other illicit drug issues.
The Australian government also provides specific criminal
penalties for PED trafficking,86 whereas the United States has no
equivalent legislation. Specifically, Australian Customs bans the
import of Erythropoietin (EPO), Human Growth Hormone
(HGH), steroids and "narcotic and psychotropic drugs that can
have auxiliary performance-enhancing effects" without a permit.
87
The policy provides for a penalty of up to a $100,000 fine and a
81. See ONDCP Fiscal Policy, supra note 73. The Policy addresses every aspect of
drug use in society, from drugs effects to their source, of which PEDs only seem to be an
afterthought. See id. The schedule of illegal drugs does not mention PEDs in specificity
nor does it include many on the drugs on the IOC's list of prohibited substances. See id;
See also 21 U.S.C.S. § 812.
82. Cf. ONDCP Fiscal Policy, supra note 73 (Only $700,000 of the $ 496.8 million
ONDCP budget and of the 19.2 billion federal drug control budget is devoted to PED use
in sports), with ONDCP Drugs in Sport, supra note 25 (Barry McCaffrey, Director of the
ONDCP, acknowledges the problem of PEDs "U.S. laws provide inadequate regulation
over a range of performance enhancing drugs. Domestic Sports, particularly professional
sports, do not ban a number of substances that are banned in international competition.
These conflicting regimes confuse athletes and the public and cause international concerns
about U.S.-based anti-doping programs.").
83. 10 THE LAWS OF AUSTRALIA 9 (John A. Riordan et al. eds., 1996).
84. Id. at 11.
85. Id. at 9-10.
86. AUSTRALIAN CUSTOMS SERVICE, supra note 32.
87. Id.
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criminal penalty of up to five years in prison. 88 The stiff fines and
punishments provide a deterrent effect to PED traffickers.
89
Australian legislation, while not as aggressive in criminalizing
all drug use as the United States, is effective, in part, because
PEDs are addressed separately in legislation. Australian PED
specific legislation reinforces the government's commitment to
enforcing its anti-doping policy. By contrast, in the United States,
where strong rhetoric exists without companion legislation,
athletes are compelled to deny their use and traffickers are
encouraged to deliver PEDs to athletes.
V. NATIONAL OLYMPIC ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR
IDEOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO THE IOC'S MEDICAL CODE
A. The Conflict Between Recruiting the Best Athletes and
Enforcing PED Policy
While U.S. and Australian legislation vary greatly, the
National Olympic Committees (NOCs) share some similarities.
Both the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) and the
Australian Olympic Committee (AOC) manage Olympic sports
for their nations. 90  Similarly, both organizations operate
independent of their respective national governments. 91 Finally,
both the USOC and the AOC are responsible for implementing
their own testing, adjudication and discipline for their athletes.
92
In Australia, responsibilities for the country's Olympic efforts
are divided between several organizations.93 In 1990, the
Australian government created the Australian Sports Drug
Agency (ASDA) as an independent office to deter doping,
promote the safety of competitors, encourage education about
PEDs, advocate for the adoption of consistent and effective anti-
doping programs and coordinate a national anti-drug program.94
88. Id. See also Press Release Minister for Justice & Customs, Senator the Honorable
Amanda Vanston, Tougher Penalties for Prohibited Imports ii Sports Drugs (Oct. 1, 2000)
(on file with author).
89. See Forbes, supra note 31.
90. OLYMPIC CHARTER ch. 4, R. 31, para. 1.
91. OLYMPIC CHARTER ch. 4, R. 31, para. 5.
92. See OLYMPIC CHARTER ch. 4, R. 31.
93. For more information on Australian Olympic sports organizations see
http://www.australian.olympic.org.
94. See 32 THE LAWS OF AUSTRALIA 35 (John A. Riordan et al. eds., 1996) (citing
Australian Sports Drug Agency Act 1990 (Cth), s 6).
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The ASDA is important because it provides an entity that is
distinct from sporting organizations and yet devoted to PED
testing. The ASDA is not responsible for promoting a particular
sport and thus has no ulterior motive. Its only function is to drug
test, not to promote athletes. 95 Thus, the ASDA's independent
existence safeguards against international criticism that it is
interested in hiding positive tests. The AOC is able to zealously
pursue the best athletes in the world while the ASDA vigorously
enforces Australia's drug policy.
Until recently there was no formal organization in the United
States to assist the USOC in the enforcement of the IOC's PED
policy.96 Thus, USOC was burdened with dual roles: one as public
relations manager to sports and the other as the drug police. In an
effort to alleviate this problem, the USOC transferred
responsibility for PED testing to a new independent agency called
the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) in October 2000.
97
Presently, the USADA claims to be "transparent" meaning it
allows IFs and WADA to freely audit its testing processes.98 The
creation of the USADA is further proof that National Organizing
Committees recognize that they cannot police their own athletes,
but should delegate PED testing to an independent third party.
This point was given further recognition in 2002 when the United
States passed legislation that officially recognizing the USADA as
the official anti-doping agency in the United States.
99
B. Willingness to Sanction Athletes for PED Violations
In addition to the importance of independent and transparent
drug testing agencies, the commitment to the IOC PED policy
should also be measured by an NOC's willingness to sanction its
athletes for violations. The AOC and the USOC both require their
athletes to comply with the IOC medical code, which contains the
95. Id.
96. While the White House and the ONDCP conduct studies and issue suggestions,
their policy does not amount to legislation. See Philip Milburn, The Form and Substance
of Independence: An Insider's View (Jan. 16, 1999) (transcript available at
http://www.law.duke.edu) (speech at Duke Conference on Doping in Sport).
97. Dick Patrick, IOC's Most Trying Test, USA TODAY, Aug. 2, 2001, at 3C; John
Meyer, News Show Misses Better Story, DENVER POST, Apr. 15,2001 at C-16.
98. Meyer, supra note 97.
99. Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-67,
115 Stat. 514.
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IOC's PED policy. 100 Their approaches to sanctions, however,
differ greatly.
The AOC's policy is more restrictive than the IOC requires or
what other nations would even consider. 101 Namely, the AOC
requires their athletes to sign an agreement to return all "prize
money, sponsorship and grant funds if they are later found to have
used drugs."' 1 2 The USOC, on the other hand, has up to this point
been reluctant to do the same. 10 3 The U.S. athlete-representative
to the IOC criticized the AOC agreement as "completely
unrealistic.' 1 4 There was concern that athletes with multi-million
dollar endorsement contracts would withdraw from the Olympics
rather than jeopardize their contracts. 105 Either the U.S.
representative is insinuating that most professional athletes are on
PEDs, or he is alluding to the fact that under the AOC agreement
any positive test creates a strict liability offense.
106
In any case, the position is insupportable. First, if most
professionals are on PEDs, they should not be able to compete in
the Games. Until the IOC makes the decision to legalize some or
all PEDs, all competitors must comply with the IOC medical code
whether they are professional or amateur athletes.
Second, even though strict liability policy has been
overturned in many. Western courts stemming from due process
and fundamental rights concerns, 10 7 the IOC must at the very least
adhere to a modified strict liability approach in order to force
athletes and their NOCs to take responsibility for PED control.
100. OLYMPIC CHARTER ch. 4, R. 31, para. 2; See INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC
COMMITrEE EXECUTIVE BOARD, EXPLANATORY MEMORADUM CONCERNING THE
APPLICATION OF THE OLYMPIC ANTI-DOPING CODE (Dec. 9, 1999), available at
http://www.olympic.org/iocde/org/medcommedcomantidopagee.html.
101. AAP, Payback Proposal Fails to Get Support, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Feb.




105. Id. "There is no way an athlete will compete if they have a $15-million or 20-
million-dollar endorsement contract" (Scott Ctvrtlik-U.S. Volleyball/OC Athletes'
committee). Id.
106. See Tony Buti, AOC Athletes' Agreement for Sydney 2000: The Implications for
the Athletes, 22 UNIv. NEW S. WALES L. J. 746, 755-759 (1999).
107. See id. Buti argues that strict liability cannot be upheld under Australian law. Id.
His argument is equally applicable to U.S. law, where due process and the notion of moral
innocent will prevent the application of strict liability without some intervening equity.
See 1 AARON N. WISE & BRUCE S. MEYER, INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW AND
BUSINESS 235-251 (1997).
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Why? A PED policy that requires intent as a prerequisite for
guilt allows the athlete, the NOC and the sponsor to justify a
positive PED test as invalid or unfair based on the athlete's
subjective intent. The strict liability approach, however,
automatically eliminates most claims of unfairness by shifting the
burden of responsibility to the athlete. A positive test, by
definition is cheating. The sponsor, who wants their product
associated with a model athlete not cheating, is thereby
encouraged to take immediate action to distance itself from the
athlete or to clear the matter up. The threat of losing contract
dollars is a self-policing mechanism causing athletes and NOCs to
take a proactive approach in evaluating what athletes are ingesting
and educating athletes about PEDs. The AOC's strict liability
policy sends the message: If you take PEDs, you will pay.
Given that many nations, like Australia and the United
States, will not accept a strict liability approach, 10 8 a modified
strict liability approach would be the optimum solution. A
modified strict liability approach would be defined as creating the
presumption of a valid test through the observance of well-defined
testing and adjudication procedures. 10 9 A positive test is then
presumed valid unless the athlete can prove it is invalid. This
compromise protects the right of the athlete to fairness and the
goals of the IOC's PED policy. Even further, clearly defined
procedures, to which all participating nations and sports bodies
adhere would avoid complicated litigation that moves between
sports arbitration commissions and national courts in a time
consuming manner.
C. Well-Defined Procedures and Full Disclosure
Both the United States and Australia have instituted well-
defined, albeit slightly different, procedures that overcome due
process objections. In Australia, the ASDA can only invalidate
positive tests in three instances: (1) the testing procedures related
to the sealing of the container were not followed, (2) an accredited
lab did not test the sample or (3) someone tampered with the
108. See WISE & MEYER, supra note 107; Fiona Blair, Procedural Fairness in Doping
Disputes, 22 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 885 (1999).
109. For a complete discussion of procedural fairness and PED testing see Blair, supra
note 108.
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sample. 110 Barring these concerns, the ASDA publishes all
positive drug tests on an anonymous basis whether the athlete is
exonerated or not. 111
Traditionally, the USOC has not published drug-testing
results or statistical information claiming this information was
confidential. 112 As the result of intense international criticism
before the 2000 Olympics, the USADA adopted procedures
similar to those in Australia. Namely, an USADA panel reviews
all positive tests for procedural problems with medicine, science or
chain of custody.113 Once the procedure has been determined valid
and any adjudication has been completed, the ASDA publishes
the offending athlete's name in a quarterly publication." 4
1. An illustration of how disclosure can foster better PED policy
Prior to the 2000 Games, the USOC sustained severe criticism
when Wade Exum, director of anti-doping programs for the
USOC, alleged that the USOC was not sufficiently sanctioning
athletes who were using PEDs. 1 5 He revealed that out of 5,355
tests conducted in 1999, 207 were positive, and only ten athletes
were sanctioned. 116 This low number may be explained by the fact
that some drugs are restricted, but not prohibited.117 At the time
there was no public drug testing record; thus, there was no way to
substantiate the USOC's denial of the allegations.
Reacting to international pressures the USOC removed itself
from the drug testing process. The USADA as an independent
third party took over drug testing, and subsequently began
publishing the identity of athletes who were convicted of or
110. The Honorable Justice Tricia Kavanagh, The Doping Cases and the Need for the
International Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), 22 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 721, 726
(1999).
111. THE LAWS OF AUSTRALIA, supra note 94, at 36 (citing Australian Sports Drug
Agency Act 1990 (Cth)).
112. Alan Abrahamson, USOC Official Made Big Demand, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 30,
2000, at U1.
113. See id.
114. Meyer, supra note 98; See also Press Release, United States Anti-Doping Agency,
Sanctions Issued by U.S. Anti-Doping Agency (Dec. 18, 2001), available at
http://www.usantidoping.org.
115. Alan Abrahamson & David Wharton, Exum: 50% Avoid USOC Sanction, L.A.
TIMES, June 22, 2000, at D3.
116. Id.
117. OLYMPIC MOVEMENT ANTI-DOPING CODE, supra note 8, at Appendix A.
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conceded to a positive drug test. 118 The USADA's goal is to make
the PED testing process above reproach by having a process that is
"transparent" for international review. 11 9
Even the new USADA policy has insufficient disclosure rules
to enforce the IOC's drug policy. The ASDA disclosures are better
for two reasons: (1) it avoids the privacy concerns associated with
disclosing the name of a particular athlete and (2) provides
complete statistical data on all positive drug tests without the delay
of pending adjudication. While the USADA policy demonstrates a
strong stance against convicted PED abusers, it is incomplete
because it does not provide the international community with the
complete picture.
2. Disclosure collects data for PED research
Disclosure of statistical information regarding PED use, such
as the ASDA's National Register, is more advantageous than the
USADA's disclosures because it allows for the compilation of
research data. Part of the problem with PEDs is, even though
estimations of PED use can be high, 120 the actual demographics of
use are unknown. 121 If the international community cannot gather
information about how many and what types of athletes use PEDs
then it is difficult to discern how to effectively implement changes
to rules and testing programs.
Lacking information, the international community cannot
effectively discipline PED offenders. There is no clear indication
of which kinds of athletes are using and what kinds of drugs are
being used. If PED use is purely to cheat, the international
community will certainly want to punish or expel offending
athletes. Currently, the IOC and civil authorities take this
disciplinary approach, which provides for prohibition, stiff
penalties and, in some countries, criminalization.
122
On the other hand, if PED use is more akin to a disease as
Australian law contemplates, the IOC may want to rehabilitate
athletes with medicinal treatment. 123 Some empirical evidence
118. Meyer, supra note 98; Press Release, supra note 114.
119. See Meyer, supra note 98.
120. Lesser, supra note 20.
121. Zorpette, supra note 10, at 17.
122. OLYMPIC MOVEMENT ANTI-DOPING CODE, supra note 8, at ch. 2, art. 3.
123. Cummiskey, supra note 25.
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supports this view. 124 If true, the goal of any PED program should
be to rehabilitate the athlete and assure athletes that they can
compete cleanly and fairly against others doing the same.
125
It has been suggested that the current criminalization
approach of the IOC and national governments "creates an us
against them atmosphere in which the civil governments dictate
athlete behavior via the 'pee-police."' 126  Without more
demographic information, it is impossible to evaluate whether the
international sports community's approach is appropriate.
Along with their disciplinary uses, information and statistics
about the types of athletes taking PEDs and what types of drugs
they tested positive for would allow the IOC and NOCs to create
financially efficient PED programs. PED testing could then target
specific sports or substances. As mentioned previously, some
PEDs are restricted, but not prohibited such as stimulants used to
treat asthma.127 These drugs do enhance performance, but are
allowable for some athletes when there is an extreme health
need.128 Statistical data will help the IOC clarify if use of restricted
drugs is really medically necessary or being used to end-run the
anti-doping regulations. For instance, it is estimated that Nordic
skiers have asthma, or claim to have asthma, at six to seven times
the rate of the general population; that is 40-50% of skiers are
using restricted asthma medications. 129 Ultimately, information is
the only way to efficiently direct PED efforts ensuring that the
right athletes and the right drugs are being tested and regulated.
While the United States and Australia have both embraced
the notion of international review of PED testing through third
party testing organizations, the United States has not committed to
the IOC medical code to the same extent as Australia. The USOC
and AOC's differing approaches to the IOC medical code reflect
their differing ideological attempts to eradicate the PED problem.
The AOC seems to be interested in sharing information and
124. Id. The study is based on a presentation to the IOC Committee of the
Harmonization of Methods and Measurements in Doping in Sport of a database of anti-
doping regulations in thirty-four countries. Id. The presentation was summarized and
analyzed in an article by the medical officer of the Olympic Counsel of Ireland. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. OLYMPIC MOVEMENT ANTI-DOPING CODE, supra note 8, at Appendix A.
128. Id.
129. Benedict Carey, Olympic Rule Puts Spotlight on Asthma and Exercise, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 4,2002, at Si.
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solving the PED problem at the international level. By sharing
statistics about their athletes' PED tests and causing extreme
financial consequences for PED-abusing athletes, the AOC is
adding to the international effort to ban PEDs. The USOC, on the
other hand, has not until recently been willing to subject itself to
the same level of international scrutiny. The USADA continues to
be unwilling to share statistical information on the demographics
of PED testing, instead hiding behind the guise of due process.
Even further, they have been unwilling to involve themselves to
the same extent to financially sanction offending athletes. These
actions lead to a compromised enforcement of the IOC's medical
code.
VI. DISPUTING POSITIVE PED TESTS THROUGH ARBITRATION
Once an athlete tests positive for PEDs the overriding
concerns are the speed and manner in which any dispute over the
result will be resolved. Currently, in both the United States and
Australia, 130 positive tests are referred back to the National
Governing Body of the particular sport (NGB) for further
action.131 Following the IF's rules, the NGB will immediately
suspend the athlete from competition pending a resolution and
provide the opportunity for a hearing. 132 After the NGB renders a
decision, it may be appealed to arbitration in both countries for a
final and binding decision.133
In the United States, appeals go to the American Arbitration
Association (AAA) 134 and in Australia, the appeals go to the
National Sports Dispute Centre (NSDC).135 In addition to these
130. Historically in Australia, sports were viewed as a game and not a business.
Therefore, Australians were reluctant for the courts to become involved in sporting
disputes. Similarly, "it is generally accepted that the nature of sport itself demands that
any dispute be resolved quickly, cheaply and with a minimum of fuss... [F]urther, it is also
recognized that such disputes are best handled by those who know and love the game,
rather than by a body of persons who do not have a 'feel' for the game." See THE LAWS
OF AUSTRALIA, supra note 94, at 7.
131. See id at 17-24; Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act, 36 U.S.C.S. §
220505 (Lexis 1999).
132. Blair, supra note 108, at 887.
133. See 36 U.S.C.S. § 220522(a)(4)(B); THE LAWS OF AUSTRALIA, supra note 94, at
33,38.
134. See 36 U.S.C.S. § 220522(a)(4)(B).
135. See THE LAWS OF AUSTRALIA, supra note 94, at 31-34.
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bodies, NGBs can also place a clause in their by-laws to allow
appeals to go to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS).
136
A. The Arbitration Process Can Be Slow
While the systems in the United States and Australia are well
defined, in practice the systems can be slow.137 If an athlete is
barred from participating in her sport until the dispute is
completely resolved, competitions may be forfeited based on
erroneous results. The motivation behind this harsh policy "is to
make international sport's governance uniform and to protect the
integrity of the event .... While admirable, such an aim often
conflicts with athletes' rights, as individuals, and their access to
fundamental principles of natural justice."'138 While the immediate
punitive action preserves the integrity of the immediate
competition (e.g. banning the athlete from competition until the
issue is adjudicated), this action can also undermine the fairness
the sport was trying to protect if the athlete is later found to be
innocent. 1
39
Due to this balancing between athletes' rights and the
integrity of sport, arbitration decisions are not always final and
binding140 and can be challenged in national courts further
delaying the process. 141 Likewise, IFs often apply strict liability to
drug offenses, 142 and thereby do not recognize the decisions of the
national arbitrators. Instead, they institute their own hearings.1
43
The athlete is then faced with the possibility of conflicting
decisions when the two bodies arrive at different results. 144 The
athlete is effectively banned from competition for months while
the decision is pending.
136. See id.; Kavanagh, supra note 110, at 735-739. CAS is the International Court of
Arbitration for Sport. CAS is an appeals court where athletes can appeal after they have
exhausted all attempts outlined by their IFs and NGBs. See Kavanagh, supra note 110.
137. See, e.g., WISE & MEYER, supra note 107, at 235-239.
138. Kavanagh, supra note 110, at 723.
139. For an interesting discussion of athletes' natural rights see Kavanagh, supra note
110, at 723 and Blair, supra notel08, at 887.
140. See Milburn, supra note 96.
141. See WISE & MEYER, supra note 107, at 235-239.
142. See id. at 235.
143. See id. at 235-239.
144. See id. For example, Jessica Foschi, a U.S. swimmer, was caught between a
decision of the AAA and that of FINA (Swimming IF). Id. FINA held Foschi strictly
liable for the positive drug test and banned her from competition, whereas the AAA
found the positive test to be inadvertent. Id.
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B. U.S. and Australia Should Use CAS
While the United States and Australia have embraced
arbitration, they need to further embrace CAS. In theory,
arbitration in both countries is final, subject to objections on
procedural grounds for errors at law.145 The disagreement between
courts on sanctions, however, eliminates the finality of a decision
to the detriment of the athlete, who unnecessarily misses
competitions, and the parties who pay for the multiple hearings.
The move toward CAS is preferable because it "blend[s]...
national and international institution into a single process of
justice that avoids complexity.' 146 CAS can eliminate the athlete's
dilemma between national laws and IF sanctions and promote
efficient and inexpensive resolution to doping disputes. 147
C. The Need for an International Treaty on PED Policy
If CAS is adopted, all affected parties must submit to its
jurisdiction and it must have uniform PED sanctions. Currently,
there is no agreement regarding appropriate sanctions for different
PED violations. 148 Different countries and different sports apply
different PED schemes. 149 To effectuate change, some have
suggested an "International Performance Enhancing Drug
Elimination Treaty." 150 This type of consensus, supported by an
independent body such as CAS would allay the fears of the IFs
and national governments thereby removing athletes from the
contentious war between them.
VII. CONCLUSION
PEDs pose a complex problem for the Olympic movement
and the world. They threaten the existence of the Games, the
health of athletes and even the health of civilians. The IOC has set
a strict PED policy banning many PEDs completely. The IOC,
145. THE LAWS OF AUSTRALIA, supra note 94, at 18-19; See 36 U.S.C.S. § 220529(d).
AAA must abide by rules of due process and fundamental fairness; WISE & MEYER,
supra note 107, at 235.
146. Kavanagh, supra note 110, at 744 (citing J.A. Nafziger, International Sports Law
as a Process for Resolving Disputes, SPORT & LAW 31 (1995)).
147. Id. (citing David Grace, in C. Laird, A Sporting Chance: Defending Cathy Watt's
Right to Ride, 8 L. INST. J. 8, 9 (1996)).
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recognize the problem, there is no incentive for their athletes to
abide by the IOC's rules because there is no penalty for disobeying
the rules.
Similarly, NOCs must be responsible for policing PEDs in
their own athletes. Like the IOC, NOCs have a narrow focus of
producing the best athletes for the Olympic Games. This goal
conflicts with their ability to enforce PED policy. In Australia, the
conflict of interest is virtually eliminated because the ASDA tests
for PEDs and the AOC advocates for its athletes, independently of
each other. The commitment to PED policy is also highlighted by
the AOCs willingness to fine their athletes for PED infractions.
The USOC, until recently, did not have an independent body to
test for PEDs, thus its reputation in the international community
has been marred by accusations of cheating, which could easily
have been prevented.
In addition, information on demographics of PED use needs
to be public information. Publishing all positive PED tests, such as
in the Australian National Register, gives valuable information
about the types of athletes who use PEDs and why they are using
them. In turn, this information allows for an effectively tailored
PED policy that efficiently uses finances, targets the right drugs
and applies the proper sanctions or medical treatments as
appropriate.
Finally, arbitration for PEDs needs to be streamlined by an
international agreement explaining how disputed PED results will
be settled and what the penalties will be. Australia and the United
States have very similar systems of arbitration in place, however,
the arbitration decisions are irrelevant to the IFs. This concurrent
jurisdiction wastes needless time and money leaving athletes in
limbo with no final and binding decision. In order to facilitate
efficient arbitration, CAS should become the exclusive body to
settle PED disputes. This should be implemented through an
international treaty on PEDs negotiated among all nations and
international sports bodies, and should enumerate arbitration
procedures, sanctions and enforcement.
While the Australians appear to have implemented a more
efficient system to resolve PED infraction disputes, the United
States is not far behind in emulating it. The IOC, however, can
only be ultimately successful if their participating national
governments, IFs and NOCs are complicit in an international PED
policy. The specific policy is less important than consistency
throughout the world. This ensures fairness and equality among all
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States have very similar systems of arbitration in place, however,
the arbitration decisions are irrelevant to the IFs. This concurrent
jurisdiction wastes needless time and money leaving athletes in
limbo with no final and binding decision. In order to facilitate
efficient arbitration, CAS should become the exclusive body to
settle PED disputes. This should be implemented through an
international treaty on PEDs negotiated among all nations and
international sports bodies, and should enumerate arbitration
procedures, sanctions and enforcement.
While the Australians appear to have implemented a more
efficient system to resolve PED infraction disputes, the United
States is not far behind in emulating it. The IOC, however, can
only be ultimately successful if their participating national
governments, IFs and NOCs are complicit in an international PED
policy. The specific policy is less important than consistency
throughout the world. This ensures fairness and equality among all
athletes and organizations because prior notice allows them to
operate from the same assumptions.
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